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Abstract
Context: Many of the alternatives for procuring donor organs are considered either ineffective,
unethical, or illegal. One possibility that may not face such challenges is a priority system whereby
individuals who register as an organ donor are given priority to receive an organ over those who
have not registered. However, providing extrinsic rewards can sometimes paradoxically reduce the
target behavior, especially for those who are more altruistically motivated.
Methods: Two behavioral experiments were employed and data were analyzed using regressions
as well as examining open-ended responses.
Findings: The results suggest that giving priority to receive an organ to those who register to
donate postmortem could increase overall registration rates. Further, the effect of providing priority
appears to work by inducing anticipated regret, which can be used to overcome common obstacles
to registration. Finally, it was found that a priority system is most effective in increasing donor rates
for those individuals who are less altruistically motivated and does not reduce registration rates for
those who are more altruistically motivated.
Conclusions: Given the unabated shortage of transplant organs, the finding that a priority system
could increase the willingness to register as a donor without crowding out altruistically motivated
individuals is highly encouraging.
Keywords organ donation, priority, anticipated regret, altruism, crowding out

Increasing the number of viable organs for transplantation is of the utmost
importance. The United States leads the world in transplantations performed and has the fourth highest donor rate per capita (Lupkin 2013).
However, over 114,000 people remain on the waiting list to receive an
organ in order to survive, with an estimated 20 people dying each day for
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lack of an organ (HHS n.d.). Even with high awareness levels (98% of US
adults are aware of the need for organ donation), only 54% of US adults
have registered to be organ donors postmortem (HHS n.d.). Thus, developing policies to increase organ donor registration is exceedingly important. Each donor can donate to save up to eight lives by bestowing multiple
organs (AOPO n.d.; Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Kessler and Roth 2012;
OPTN n.d.), meaning any increase in donors could have a substantial effect
on increasing the availability of organs, even though only 2% of deaths are
medically suitable for transplantation (CORE n.d.).
The United States currently utilizes an “opt-in” system for organ donation, whereby organs cannot be procured from a deceased donor without
explicit consent from either the individuals before their deaths or from their
families after death (Cameron et al. 2013) and with no direct or personal
benefit to the deceased or their relatives. Individuals can opt into the donor
pool when they obtain a driver’s license or through an online organ registry.
The Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 (ULC 2018) barred family members from
overriding an individual’s decision to donate. While it has been the law that
an individual’s consent to donate was legally binding, until the past few
years, it was the practice of the Association of Organ Procurement Organizations to also gain the consent of the family members. However, this
practice changed as online registration evolved, and now registered donations may take place even when the family objects (Glazier 2018).
To date, the primary approach to increasing the number of registered
organ donors in the United States has been to appeal to altruism (Joralemon
and Cox 2003), with many state registry campaigns based on the “Gift of
Life” appeal and others encouraging individuals to “Become a hero for life”
(Feeley 2007: 243). The altruistic approach relies on an individual’s intrinsic
motivation to contribute to society through registration. Although there were
a record number of organs transplanted in the United States in 2017 and the
list of those waiting for an organ has minimally declined since 2015, the
number of people remaining on the waiting list was greater than three times
the number of transplants performed (OPTN n.d.). So while 2017 was a
record year for transplants (35,000 people received organs), more than
50,000 people were added to the waitlist (Alcorn 2018). The growth in
transplanted organs is due in part to the usage of organs that would previously have been discarded (Glicksman 2018) as well as a dramatic increase
in drug overdose deaths (Torjesan 2018). Thus, as has been true for decades,
with the demand for organs exceeding the supply, motivations to register as
an organ donor beyond the altruism approach are needed.
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As an alternative, the current research examines the effectiveness of a
donation system that provides an extrinsic motive (i.e., external to the individual) to become an organ donor. Specifically, a priority system (also
known as a mutual insurance pool; Schwindt and Vining 1998) gives those
who register to donate postmortem a higher place on the list to receive an
organ (compared to those who have not registered), should they need one.
Similar systems have been implemented in countries outside the United
States with some success. For example, in 2010 Israel implemented a law
to give priority points to those who had signed up to become an organ
donor postmortem. Under this system, individuals are able to gain differing
degrees of priority either through consenting to donate their own organs
after death, making a nondirected live donation, or being a first-degree
relative of someone who registered as an organ donor, even if they are not
registered themselves (Cronin 2014). If they were to need an organ transplant, they would receive priority over an otherwise equally matched
individual who was not registered. In the first year of the program, deceased
organ donation rates increased 46% from 7.8 to 11.4 donors per million and
the number of registered donors increased from 10% to almost 14% (Lavee
et al. 2013). However, the differences between countries in terms of the
base percent of registered donors (54% in the United States vs. 10% in
Israel) as well as culture differences limit the applicability of these findings
to the United States without further research.
Most of the studies examining the viability of introducing a similar priority system in the United States have elicited attitudes toward
such systems using survey research or qualitative methods. For example,
Spital (2005) surveyed American adults and found 53% were in favor of
a priority system, and Jasper et al. (1999) found that 54% of existing
American adult nondonors would choose to donate under a priority system. Although there is initial support for the introduction of a priority system, the general consensus appears to be that more research is
required before implementing similar systems in countries such as the
United States.
One notable example of research utilizing an experimental methodology
to examine organ donor behavior (as opposed to relying on self-reported
attitudes) is that by Kessler and Roth (2012). Using a decision-game paradigm, the authors tested the potential impact of a priority registration
system in the United States. They found that giving allocation priority for
those on a waiting list could have a positive impact on registration. However, in their experimental game, no explicit mention of organs was made.
Instead, participants were given the opportunity to pay money to receive
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“units” that could enhance their chances of staying “alive” in the game.
That is, the realities of organ donation, with preexisting beliefs and associated emotions were absent, meaning it cannot be certain a priority system
will be well received in the United States based on these results alone.
Further, there has yet to be an investigation into why a priority system
works at encouraging individuals to register as an organ donor. Specifically,
a priority system may elicit anticipated regret. Individuals may be motivated to avoid a situation where they are in need of an organ but potentially
unable to receive one due to failure to have registered as a donor, placing
them too far below others who have registered as donors.
Regret, and more specifically anticipated regret, is a strong predictor
of behavior (Brewer, DeFrank, and Gilkey 2016). It has been shown to
influence a number of health-related behaviors such as contraception use
(Richard, Vries, and Pliget 1998) and giving blood (Godin et al. 2005).
Anticipated regret has also been shown to be a potential tool to overcome
common barriers to organ donor registration (O’Carroll et al. 2011). Rather
than deleting the who section, can you put back in the sentence “In the
current context, making salient the potential need for an organ could create
anticipated regret in some individuals, resulting in a decision to register
in order to increase one’s chances of receiving an organ. Although the
effectiveness of a priority system (Kessler and Roth 2012) and anticipated
regret (O’Carroll et al. 2011) have been tested separately in relation to
organ donor registration, no study has explored whether anticipatory regret
could play a role in encouraging individuals to register under a priority
system. O’Carroll et al. (2011) found that manipulating anticipated regret
by explicitly asking participants if they would feel regret if they did not
register significantly increased reported organ donor registrations. This
finding showed the powerful influence of anticipated regret can have on
intentions and behavior related to registering as an organ donor. However, in a large-scale field study, the opposite effect was found: that an
anticipated regret intervention decreased registration rates, presumably
because the questionnaire primed negative perceptions of organ donations
(O’Carroll et al. 2016). Thus, a more implicit method of priming anticipated regret, such as through providing priority, may be more effective. On
the downside, the introduction of an extrinsic reward—that is, receiving
priority—for registering as an organ donor could backfire by decreasing
the likelihood of certain individuals registering for altruistic reasons.
Intrinsic motivation arises from the value an individual gains personally
and privately, such as pure altruism toward increasing others’ well-being
(Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009). Those motivated by altruistic reasons
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tend to donate to feel good about themselves and their actions (Dawson
1988), through their empathy toward someone in need (Batson and Coke
1981) and desire to help (Supphellen and Nelson 2001). Psychological
benefits stem from intangible intrinsic benefits that an individual personally receives, or costs they have personally avoided, by helping others
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). By giving, donors can experience affirmative psychological consequences in the form of a warm glow (Andreoni,
1990) or empathic joy (Batson and Shaw 1991).
However, Mellström and Johannesson (2008) found that changing the
process for recruiting blood donors from a social approach (e.g., helping
others) to an economic approach (e.g., receive payment) decreased the
supply of donors by almost half. When extrinsic rewards and incentives to
donate are offered, the question of whether someone is acting prosocially
to do good becomes harder to answer (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009),
and extrinsic rewards may tarnish the reputational reward of acting prosocially (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), paradoxically resulting in a decrease
in the target behavior. That is, with the inclusion of an extrinsic reward or
payment, the positive signal to others that one is altruistic is diminished,
with others potentially considering that individual to be greedy or selfish
(Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009). Therefore, could providing priority (i.e.,
an extrinsic benefit) have a negative impact on registration rates for
altruistically motivated individuals, resulting in a “crowding out” (Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee 1997) of these potential donors?
The purpose of this research is to (a) examine whether the increase in
intentions to donate organs using a priority system is still present when
using a more realistic analog for the actual process of registering as an
organ donor in the United States, (b) understand why individuals who
have not registered as organ donors are more likely to register under a
priority system, and (c) test whether providing an extrinsic benefit negatively affects the registration likelihood for those who are motivated to
donate for primarily altruistic reasons. We report the results of two
experiments that examine these issues. Our results hold implications for
the design and introduction of a priority system for organ donation in the
United States.
Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 is to provide an initial test of the effectiveness of
providing priority for receiving an organ on the likelihood to register as a
donor. In addition, we explore motivations for decisions to donate.
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Method

Two hundred and one participants from across the United States (MAge =
36.62, SD = 11.83; 53% female) who were not registered as organ donors
were recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and
were paid a nominal fee for participating. Data collection was not terminated until the desired sample size was met. Recruiting through MTurk
allowed us to organically recruit a diverse set of people that have been
shown to correspond with national probability samples (Coppock 2018).
The advertisement posted to MTurk explicitly asked for participants not
currently registered as an organ donor. As an extra screening procedure,
the survey began with the question “To the best of your knowledge, are you
currently registered to be an organ donor (that is, to have your organs
donated should you die)?” (Yes, No, Not Sure). Those who did not answer
“No” were told they did not qualify for the study and were unable to
proceed through the survey. This initial question should not have appeared
out of place given the survey was openly about organ donation opinions
of existing nondonors. Though participants self-reported their own registration status, and proportions were in line with the national average, we
cannot verify if all responses were accurate.
Two written responses were found to be identical indicating the presence
of a repeat participant, so these two responses were removed from the data
set. The analyses were performed using the remaining 199 data points.
After agreeing to participate in the study and passing through the aforementioned screening question, participants were asked to “Imagine you are
renewing your license today. If you were faced with the following prompt
during this process regarding becoming an organ donor, what would your
response be?” All participants were told to “Select the choice that reflects
your wishes,” but those randomly assigned to the Priority condition were
also told that “registering as an organ donor will get you placed higher on
the list to receive an organ should you need one.” (They were debriefed at
the end of the experiment that this was not true). Those in the Control
condition were not given any extra information. Next, all participants
indicated whether they would be willing to join the donor registry (“Yes, I
want to join the Donor Registry” vs. “No, I do not want to join the Donor
Registry”), which was used as the dependent variable. On the subsequent
page of the survey, all participants were then asked to write a minimum of
250 characters explaining what motivated them to indicate they would or
would not register as an organ donor. These open-ended responses were
used to qualitatively explore the motivations behind why individuals act
in this situation and why introducing a priority system might entice
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individuals to register as a donor. The survey concluded with participants
answering demographic-related questions (e.g., age, gender; see appendix
for results). If the repeat participants’ responses were included, the results
remained unchanged.
Results and Discussion

Effect of Priority. A logistic regression was used to examine whether registration likelihood varied across conditions. Specifically, we expected
higher registration likelihood when participants were told that they would
receive priority for registering. The prompt variable (coded: Control = 0,
Priority = 1) was included as the independent variable and the registration
choice (coded: Did not register = 0, Registered = 1) was included as the
dependent variable. As expected, participants in the Priority condition
were significantly more likely to register as an organ donor (55%) compared to those in the Control condition (39%, b = .64, SE = .28, v2 = 4.82,
p < .05).
Open-Ended Responses. Examining the open-ended responses revealed
qualitative insights as to why the priority system works. All open-ended
responses were read and coded by two independent coders who were aware
of the hypothesis and conditions. In situations where multiple reasons
were provided by a participant, the coders made judgements as to which
was the “primary” reason. Any discrepancies in coding (87% agreement)
were discussed and agreed on. Table 1 and table 2 show the frequencies of
each primary reason provided. Descriptions of each category are included
in table 3.
From Table 1 it can be seen that Discomfort, Incentive-Driven Mistrust,
and a Lack of Knowledge are the three most cited reasons for choosing
not to register as an organ donor, accounting for 28.3%, 20.0%, and 11.7%
of respondents respectively. The other reasons (i.e., Religion/Spirituality,
Competence-Driven Mistrust, Perceived Ineligibility, No Directed Donation, Effort, and Not Sure/No Reason) all accounted for less than 10% each.
However, for those offered priority, the proportion of respondents providing Discomfort, Lack of Knowledge, Religion/Spirituality, No Directed
Donation, and Effort as reasons for not registering was lower, with Discomfort experiencing the greatest proportional decrease. Conversely, the
proportion of respondents providing Incentive-Driven Mistrust, CompetenceDriven Mistrust, Perceived Ineligibility, Not Sure/No Reason, and Unfair
as reasons for not registering increased. For those in table 1, there was a
marginally significant association between priority system and the reasons
provided for not registering as an organ donor (v2 = 16.22, p < .10),
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Table 1 Frequencies of Reasons for Indicating “No” to Registering
as an Organ Donor in Study 1
Control

Priority

Reason

n

%

n

%

Discomfort
Incentive-driven mistrust
Lack of knowledge
Religion/spirituality
Competence-driven mistrust
Perceived ineligibility
No directed donation effort
Not sure/no reason
Unfair

17
12
7
4
3
2
2
2
0

28.3
20.0
11.7
6.7
5.0
3.3
3.3
3.3
0.0

8
10
2
1
3
7
0
3
3

17.8
22.2
4.4
2.2
6.7
17.8
0.0
6.7
6.7

Table 2 Frequencies of Reasons for Indicating “Yes” to Registering
as an Organ Donor in Study 1
Control

Priority

Reason

n

%

n

%

Altruism
Fairness/reciprocity
Not sure/no reason
Benefits of priority
Personal experience

34
3
2
0
0

87.2
7.7
5.1
0.0
0.0

21
0
1
32
1

38.2
0.0
1.8
58.2
1.8

providing evidence that the relative weight of certain reasons was different
for those offered priority. Much of this result can assumedly be driven by
Discomfort, as it experienced the greatest difference in proportion of
respondents providing it as the primary reason for not registering.
From table 2, it can be seen that Altruism was stated by most of the
respondents (87.2%) as the reason for choosing to register as an organ
donor, with Fairness/Reciprocity and Not Sure/No Reason accounting for
the remaining 12.8%. For those offered priority, the proportion of respondents providing Altruism, Fairness/Reciprocity, and Not Sure/No Reason
as reasons for registering was lower than those in the control condition.
Notably, those indicating Benefits of Priority as the primary reason account
for the majority of respondents under the priority system (58.2%). Personal
Experience also experienced an increase, although this was only a single
respondent. For those in table 2, there was a significant association between
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Table 3 Category Definitions and Examples of Reasons to Register
or Not Register in Study 1
Reason Categories

Reason Examples

Altruism
Benefit of priority

The right/moral thing to do.
Would have a greater chance at receiving an organ
should they need one.
Fear of mutilation.
Funeral appearance considerations.
Need organs in the afterlife.
Physicians may incorrectly pronounce patients
brain-dead.
May be conscious and aware during organ removal
process.
Do not like to think about death.
Do not like to think about having their organs
removed and placed in someone else.
The process is unnatural.
Do not have the motivation to go through the
process of registering.
Believe that if they want to receive an organ then
they should be willing to donate an organ.
That physicians may not try as hard to save their
life if they are registered as a donor.
Hospitals are incentivized to let you die.
Need to know more about the process of organ
donation before making a decision.
Need to talk to family more before making a
decision.
Cannot stipulate that their organs go to family
or friends.
Cannot stipulate that their organs will not go to
someone “undeserving.”
No reason specifically provided.
Believe that they are too unhealthy or too old to
register as a donor.
Someone close to them needed an organ, which
was used as motivation to register.
Religion precludes them from donating.
The priority system is unfair so they opt to not
register as a donor.

Body kept intact

Competence based
mistrust

Discomfort

Effort
Fairness/reciprocity
Incentive-based mistrust

Lack of knowledge

No direct donation

No reason/not sure
Perceived ineligibility
Personal experience
Religion/spirituality
Unfair
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priority system and the reasons provided for registering as an organ donor
(v2 = 37.78, p < .001). This provides evidence that the proportion of certain
reasons provided for registering or not registering as a donor was significantly different when priority was offered, driven largely by the increase
in participants citing the benefits of the priority system as the primary
reason for registering as an organ donor.
Given that the Discomfort reason experienced the greatest decline in
proportional frequency of use, this suggests that individuals who feel
uncomfortable (i.e., the “Discomfort” category) when considering being an
organ donor may be the most influenced by the introduction of the priority
system. Examining participants’ (i.e., those who indicated “Yes”) openended responses uncovered support for this conclusion. As an example, one
participant wrote: “My initial reaction was a bit of wariness, since while I
intellectually get that giving an organ is a good and helpful thing, there is
something my mind finds off about the idea of someone else having my
organs after I’m dead. . . . But then I imagined myself in the situation where
*I* needed an organ, and how much I would regret not being on the list
then. That potential benefit was enough to push me past my hesitation and
squeamishness.”
Intuitively, this makes sense. Those who indicated, for example, that
they would like to learn more or that they do not trust the medical profession are less likely to be influenced by the priority prompt. However,
those who realize that organ donation is a noble gesture but feel discomfort
when considering the reality of donating an organ are likely to overcome
this discomfort and register.
The results of tables 1 and 2 also suggest that anticipated regret may play
an important role in deciding whether to register as an organ donor under
a priority system. To qualitatively examine this finding, we reviewed the
open-ended responses of those who chose to become an organ donor under
the priority system. In these responses there are several instances of individuals discussing their anticipated regret. For example, responses such
as “I think that if I was in a really bad need for an organ and I was on the list
to receive an organ I would really want to make sure that I had the best
possible chance of getting a new organ” and “I would like to be able to live
if I were to ever get into a really bad accident, and if that’s all I have to do,
well then that’s what I would do” suggest that participants realized that
if they don’t register and they become in need of an organ, they may not
receive one under a priority system. Other participants talked about wanting to ensure they would remain alive for their children, or that “Lists for
organs can be long and sometimes people die before receiving what they
need. I would definitely be influenced by an indication that the wait times
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could be reduced for those just as willing to give as receive” and “When you
put your life into the equation and get a personal benefit, i.e., possibly
living vs. dying, that carries a powerful motivation.”
Beyond the motivating aspects of the priority system, there were contrasting insights gleaned from the open-ended responses as well. Specifically, some individuals indicated they would not register under a priority
system because it was considered unfair. That is, even though they saw the
altruistic benefits of being a donor, they felt that being given priority over
someone else was prejudicial, so they opted not to register. This reveals the
potential of crowding out altruistically motivated individuals after the
introduction of a priority system. This issue is further addressed in study 2.
Overall, this initial study supports previous research that suggests a priority system may entice individuals to register as organ donors (e.g., Kessler
and Roth 2012) and that, for many, there are several different obstacles
to registering (e.g., Burkell, Chandler, and Shemie 2013). Interestingly, it
appears that a priority system may be able to overcome some of these obstacles by providing a personal incentive. However, providing extrinsic rewards
can potentially backfire by discouraging more altruistically motivated
individuals from acting (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997).
Study 2

The aim of study 2 is to extend the findings from study 1 in two ways. First,
a more realistic paradigm is used, and second, whether those who are more
altruistically motivated are “crowded out” by the inclusion of the extrinsic
reward of priority is examined.
Method

Five hundred and six participants from all across the United States were
recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and were paid a
nominal fee for participating. Data collection was not terminated until the
desired sample size was met. This sample included 211 participants who
said they were not currently registered to be organ donors (MAge = 33.38,
SD = 10.07; 42% female) and 276 participants who said they were currently registered (MAge = 33.99, SD = 9.54; 45% female). Nineteen participants who said they were not sure if they were registered or not were
omitted from the analyses (MAge = 33.52, SD = 10.47; 53% female).
Participants were informed that they would be evaluating a section of a
new Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) website, specifically the section of
the website that will be used for the license renewal process. This cover
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story allowed us to elicit organ donation requests in a more naturalistic
context without revealing the true motivations of the research.
First, participants were shown a mock-up of the RMV homepage and
asked questions consistent with the cover story (e.g., How simple is the
homepage?). Second, participants were shown the introductory screen to
the driver’s license renewal page and also asked similar questions consistent with the cover story. Third, participants began the process of renewing
their license where they were given descriptions of the different types of
licenses, and were instructed to click on the type of license they wanted to
renew. Then participants were randomly assigned to see one of two different organ donation pages under the guise of being “Step 2” in the license
renewal process. Those randomly assigned to the Control condition were
asked to “Select the option that reflects your wishes” (“Yes, I want to join
the Donor Registry” vs. “No, I do not want to join the Donor Registry”).
The wording used in this study is similar to that used by many state
registries. Those randomly assigned to the Priority condition were told
“People who sign up to be an organ donor are placed higher on the list to
receive an organ, should they need one” and then were provided with
similar options as in the Control condition (“Yes, I want to join the Donor
Registry and be given priority to receive an organ should I need one” vs.
“No, I do not want to join the Donor Registry”). The dependent variable
was whether the participant indicated they would register or not register.
Although most donor registries do require people to make a choice, participants in both conditions were informed they were able to opt out of the
decision simply by not selecting a response.
All participants then completed questions consistent with the cover
story by rating the new website and providing feedback. Finally, participants answered demographic questions (e.g., gender, age; see appendix for
results), whether they were in reality registered as an organ donor (Yes, No,
Not Sure), and the 20-item altruism scale (Rushton et al. 1981), which was
used to examine the presence of any crowding-out (Frey and OberholzerGee 1997). The altruism scale was asked last (i.e., after all of the non-organdonation-related demographic questions) to allow the greatest separation
from the main survey. However, we cannot say with absolute certainty that
the manipulation, registration questions, or decisions to register did not
influence subsequent self-reported altruism.
Results and Discussion

To examine whether the effect of the priority prompt differed depending
on an individuals’ altruism level, we ran a binary logistic regression that
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Figure 1 Interaction between presence/absence of priority
and altruism on hypothetically registering as an organ donor for
all participants.

included the prompt condition (coded: Control = 0, Priority = 1) and meancentered altruism (a = .93, M = 2.81, SD = .71) as the independent variables, their respective interaction term, current donor status (coded:
Non-Registered Donor = -1, Registered Donor = 1) as a covariate, and
participants’ choice (coded: Did Not Register = 0, Registered = 1) as the
dependent variable. The results revealed a significant effect of the priority
prompt condition, whether the participant was previously registered as a
prospective donor, and the interaction between the prompt and altruism.
The main effect of altruism was not significant.
Thus, the effect of the priority system in encouraging registration relative to the current system is greater at lower levels of altruism, but not at
higher levels (figure 1). In addition, no drop-off in registration likelihood
is observed for those who scored high in altruism (i.e., no “crowding out” is
found; table 5).
Because nondonors are the primary target for policy changes intended to
increase donor registration rates, the same analysis was performed for the
current nondonors only. The results revealed a significant effect of prompt
condition and the interaction between the prompt and altruism. The main
effect of altruism was not significant (table 4). That is, the priority prompt
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Table 4 Results from Study 2 on the Interaction of Registration Status,
Altruism, and Prompt Conditions

All participants:
Prompt condition
Altruism
Prompt and altruism
Registration status
Nonregistered donors:
Prompt condition
Altruism
Prompt and altruism
Registered donors:
Prompt condition
Altruism
Prompt and altruism

b

SE

Wald w2

2.88
.46
-.83
2.04

1.16
.30
.40
.16

6.14*
2.43
4.29*
173.65*

3.94
.42
-1.18

1.41
.37
.50

7.82*
1.29
5.60*

-.22
.62
.14

2.09
.57
.77

.01*
1.22
.03*

Note: * p < .05

Table 5

Probabilities of Registering as an Organ Donor in Study 2

Registered donors
%
Nonregistered donors
%

Control
Priority
Control
Priority

-1 SD altruism

Mean altruism

+1 SD altruism

89
91
2
37

92
94
8
24

94
96
18
17

significantly increased donor registration likelihood among nondonors
compared to a control condition for those with lower altruism scores.
Finally, the same analysis was run with only the existing donors
(MAltruism = 2.88, SD = .67). Not surprisingly all effects failed to reach
significance (table 4), further suggesting that those who may be more
altruistically motivated are not more likely to avoid registering as an organ
donor in the presence of a priority system.
Overall, these findings suggest that the introduction of a priority system
could have a positive impact on the likelihood of registering as an organ donor
for less altruistically motivated individuals. Importantly, a priority system
may not significantly lessen altruistically motivated individuals’ intentions to
register relative to the current system. This provides evidence that “crowding
out” of those who are more altruistically motivated to donate their organs
should not occur with the addition of an extrinsic reward.
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General Discussion

This research explored an alternative approach to increasing donor registration rates by giving priority in organ allocation to those who register to
donate in the event of their death. The results of the two experiments
suggest that a priority system for organ donation could contribute to a larger
donor pool and that less altruistic people are more motivated by the priority prompt (relative to the current system). Importantly, the use of a priority prompt would not reduce donation rates for those people who scored
high on altruism. In other words, the priority system primarily appeals to
those less altruistically motivated to donate their organs without “crowding
out” those who are more altruistically motivated.
Our findings are consistent with earlier work by Kessler and Roth
(2012), extending their work in a more realistic choice context that explicitly discusses organ donation, and testing for the presence of a crowding
out effect potentially due to tarnishing the previously altruism-signaling
behavior (Bénabou and Tirole 2006). Suggesting additional elaboration is
the decision to refer to self-reported altruism as a proxy for intrinsic
motivation (to be an organ donor) in the absence of strong empirical
backing. Further, our findings differ from those of Burkell, Chandler, and
Shemie (2013) by revealing that existing nondonors are actually more
likely to register as a donor under a priority system. Finally, through the
open-ended responses of study 1, we were able to understand the motivations behind those who previously had not registered as an organ donor
but indicated they would register if given priority. It appears that many of
these individuals are motivated by anticipated regret. That is, by making
the need for organs salient, and the opportunity to increase the chance of
receiving one, individuals realize they would regret not being able to
receive an organ, resulting in an increase in donor registrations. These
open-ended responses also gave us insight into many of the obstacles
individuals report for not registering as an organ donor (e.g., discomfort).
Although the conclusions we have drawn are based on our findings, there is
still the possibility of a separate, third variable such as those noted in table
1, driving both registration choice and self-perceptions of altruism. Future
research can attempt to uncover other important variables that could
influence the efficacy of the priority system.
The priority system examined in this article has notable advantages over
other proposed approaches to increasing organ donor registrations. For
example, there have been calls for monetary payment for organs, an act that
was expressly forbidden by Congress in the National Organ Transplant Act
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in 1984. The international transplant community has continued to reject
monetary incentives as a motivator for postmortem organ donation (Leider
and Roth 2010) mostly due to ethical concerns (Rothman 2002), even
though it would likely expand the donor pool (Rosen, Vining, and Weimer
2011). A slight adjustment to the process to allow the direction of payment
to charity could circumvent these ethical issues (Mellström and Johannesson 2008), however, this approach would still rely on altruism. Another
proposed approach to increasing donor rates is to change the default from
the current opt-in mode to an opt-out mode, where consent to donate is
presumed. This approach has been implemented in 16 largely European
countries (e.g., Spain, Belgium, France; Zúñiga-Fajuri 2015) with substantially increased donation rates (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) and is
currently gaining traction in Britain and other European countries. Glazier
(2018) notes that US culture deeply values individual rights, a mindset
reflected in its laws, such that a legal gift of an organ would have to be an
active “affirmative, voluntary decision” versus a passive presumption of
consent. This is reaffirmed by repeated attempts in the United States to
introduce presumed consent laws; these efforts have fallen short in states
including Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Texas,
Vermont, and others. Further, roughly half of the US population would not
support an opt-out policy (HHS 2013) as there is a concern that implementing this policy would result in a loss of autonomy (Zink, Zeehandelaar, and Wertlieb 2005). Thus, the currently used approach (i.e., opt-in)
and suggested alternatives to increasing organ donor registration all have
notable negatives: altruism would not require legislation, but does not
increase supply expeditiously enough to keep up with demand; monetary
payments are unacceptable from both a legal and an ethical perspective,
and; presumed consent, while effective in some countries, faces hurdles in
gaining acceptance within the United States.
Therefore, such a priority system could be implemented with at least
limited change to the enabling federal statute of the National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) to establish priority for registered donors.
To incorporate such a policy into regulations governing organ allocation
requires that NOTA be modified to incorporate nonmedical criteria (priority due to organ donor registration) in addition to the current medical
criteria in allocation priority. However, in practice, this is already done as
related to age and geography, but to establish this as policy would likely
require regulatory change and might politically require the cover of legislative change.
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Despite the considerable increase in registered donors and resulting
donations in Israel (Goldfarb 2012), there have been substantial criticisms
of the donor-priority system that have to be considered. In reality, Israel’s
law did not work as well as it was expected to due to clauses in the law now
being evaluated for change. First, a clause stated that only one member of
the family needed to register in order for the whole family to receive priority for an organ; in large families, for example, only one family member
would need to register to provide preferential status for all others in the
family. Those with many direct family members have a greater potential to
find a donor match, resulting in less dependence on the public donor pool,
but these individuals would receive priority due to another member’s
registration (Quigley, Wright, and Ravitsky 2012). Second, there was some
initial concern about individuals receiving immediate priority for registering as a donor, resulting in individuals waiting until they needed an organ
to register. However, Israel’s system circumvents this issue by implementing a three-year waiting period (or only one year for those who signed
up before December 31, 2011) before an individual is added to the priority
list (Kessler and Roth 2014; Quigley, Wright, and Ravitsky 2012).
Although a similar approach would address this issue in the United States,
it also creates a new issue: any priority listing policy would likely not
include pediatric transplant candidates. Underage patients cannot register
as organ donors and cannot be held to a three-year waiting period at young
ages. In order to avoid constricting young candidates, priority points for
those between 18 and 21 years of age would need to be prorated. For
example, if someone is listed for transplant at age 20 and they registered at
age 18, they could be given full priority points despite not having been
registered for three years. Finally, as allowed by the Israeli law, some Israeli
families have refused to donate their deceased relative’s organs, even if the
relative had registered as a donor, resulting in a “free-rider” problem (i.e.,
registering in order to receive an organ if needed without any intention to
donate at the time of death; Kerr and Bruun 1983). However, this issue
would not occur in the United States as registering as a donor is viewed as
legally binding, so the families would not be asked prior to the procurement
of organs (Costa et al. 2009; Mesich-Brant and Grossback 2005). Therefore, if introduced in the United States, it is recommended that (1) priority
be given just to the registrant and not all direct family members, and (2) a
certain waiting period be enforced (e.g., three years) before an individual is
added to the priority list, unless they are under 21 when certain concessions
could be made, and the decision of an individual to donate his or her organs
in the event of their death continues to be enforced, even in the presence of
family opposition, to eliminate any free-riding.
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Although the current findings are promising, there are limitations to the
priority system itself. First, those who vehemently oppose organ donation
and therefore refuse to register as a donor could arguably be “penalized” by
remaining at the bottom of a donor list. This concern is supported by some
individuals’ responses in study 1 who chose not to register even if given
priority due to it being an unfair system. Second, one could argue that the
priority system will work only as long as registration provides a clear
benefit in terms of placement on a list for receiving an organ. In that respect,
if a priority system is too effective in encouraging registration, the perceived benefit of registering may seem too small. That is, if everyone
registers under a priority system, no one really has an advantage in terms of
receiving an organ. Still, if everyone were to register, the increased registration would result in there being many more organs available for transplant, thereby serving everyone’s interests. Regardless of these potential
issues, it appears the priority system has the ability to increase the donor
pool, which would save countless lives.
Conclusion

Organ donation is a complex and dynamic area of need. Given the immense
benefits and certainty of saving lives realized through a larger donor pool, it
is important to continually examine areas to increase organ donor registration rates. With the shortage of organs continuing to surpass 100,000
people annually while 20 people die each day for lack of an organ, and with
other proposed means to increase organ donor registration not meeting
the need, being unwanted by the public, or being illegal, the prospect of
implementing a priority system for donor registration becomes more attractive. The current findings suggest that a priority system would have a considerable effect on motivating people who are more self-interested to
become organ donors, with no negative effect on the likelihood to register
for those more altruistically motivated.
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Detailed Demographics

Category
Sample size
Age, yearsa
Gender, %b

Political orientation, %c

Education, %d

Marital status, %e

Household income, %f

Ethnicity, %b

-

Items
Median
Male
Female
Other
Far right/extremely
Conservative
Right/conservative
Center/moderate
Left/liberal
Far left/extremely liberal
No political view
Other political view
Unknown/haven’t thought
about it
Less than high school
High school/equivalent
Some college, no degree
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate degree or higher
Single, never married
Married
Separated
Widowed
Divorced
<$25k
$25k–$34,999
$35k–$49,999
$50k–$74,999
$75k–$99,999
$100k–$149,999
>$150k
White/Caucasian
Black/African American
Asian
Hispanic/Latino
Pacific Islander
Other

Study 1

Study 2

National

201
33.00
47.30
52.70
—
5.50

506
32.00
55.70
43.90
0.40
1.80

37.90
49.20
50.80
—
3.00

19.40
25.90
29.90
14.90
4.50
—
—

15.80
28.30
33.20
15.60
4.20
1.20
—

29.00
24.00
23.00
3.00
—
—
18.00

—
12.90
25.90
8.0
43.30
10.00
47.30
43.30
1.00
1.50
7.00
24.40
11.40
17.90
21.40
12.90
9.50
2.50
76.60
9.50
5.50
7.00
—
1.50

0.60
11.90
24.90
15.40
39.50
7.70
57.50
35.20
1.20
0.60
5.50
19.80
16.00
16.60
23.50
14.00
8.10
2.00
80.40
6.30
7.90
3.80
0.80
0.80

11.04
28.89
18.86
9.77
20.04
11.40
27.00
56.60
2.40
6.20
10.40
20.23
9.23
12.33
16.45
12.52
14.49
14.76
76.60
13.40
5.80
18.10
0.20

Sources of national data: aUSCB 2017b; bUSCB n.d.-c; cANES n.d.; dUSCB 2017a; eUSCB
n.d.-b; fUSCB n.d.-a.
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